Microsoft 365 brings the shutters down on legacy protocols Microsoft FrontPage was a web authoring tool that was discontinued almost two decades ago However, the protocol for remote web authoring has lived on until now Describing legacy protocols like RPC as "more susceptible to compromise," Microsoft will block them to prevent their use in Microsoft 365 clients
Retire Those Old Legacy Protocols | Microsoft Community Hub Attack Surface Reduction can be achieved by disabling support for insecure legacy protocols The SSL protocol is broken and can no longer be fixed, threats such as POODLE still exist (see cve-2014-3566) SSL protocol should be retired
Block legacy authentication with Conditional Access Based on Microsoft's analysis more than 97 percent of credential stuffing attacks use legacy authentication and more than 99 percent of password spray attacks use legacy authentication protocols These attacks would stop with basic authentication disabled or blocked
Microsoft Build 2025 Book of News The Microsoft Build 2025 Book of News is your guide to key news items that we are announcing at Microsoft Build The interactive Table of Contents gives you the option to select the items you are interested in, and the translation capabilities make the Book of News more accessible globally (just click the Translate button below the Table of Contents to enable translations)
Authentication protocols and avoiding downgrade attacks Strengthening authentication protocols is critical for protecting networks from backward compatibility Authentication protocols are a crucial component of security systems because they grant only authorized individuals or entities access to resources
How far will AI go to defend its own survival? - NBC News When Palisade Research tested various AI models by telling each one that it would be shut down after it completed a series of math problems, OpenAI’s o3 reasoning model fought back by editing
You Can’t Do That on Protocols Anymore: Analysis of Covert . . . In this paper, we analyze the work of the IETF to evaluate whether risks arising from the presence of covert channels have been considered during the standardization phase Our findings indicate that the exposure to hidden communications has been addressed only occasionally