StaFi rETH’s solution to the Slash of ETH - Medium The design of ETH2 0’s Slash mechanism is to increase the security of the chain StaFi must also take into consideration Slash when designing rETH product solutions
What can be done to prevent accidental slashing? : r ethereum It seems to me that collecting staking rewards in ETH2 0 in some respects is like picking up nickels in front of the slashing steamroller During the August Medalla network bug, many validators got slashed through no fault of their own Is it possible to protect validators against accidental slashing when they are not at fault? Edit: I probably should have differentiated staking penalties for
February 2 ETH2 slashing event - Post-mortem Staked post-mortem eth2 TLDR Staked chased technical performance over double-signing robustness and that’s not a good trade off No customers were harmed in this interaction but it was an expensive lesson for Staked and we are sharing our learnings in case they help others What happened: 75 Staked-run validators were slashed on February 2 This was a Staked technical issue, so our customers
Configure consensus layer slashing protection | Consensys Web3Signer Configure consensus layer slashing protection Configure slashing protection to prevent consensus layer validators from being penalized for signing conflicting blocks or attestations Install and manage the PostgreSQL database that stores the validator signing history for one or more Web3Signer instances
Client migration (advanced) - The Nimbus Guide Client migration (advanced) The main migration guide is located here Here we document a couple of advanced options you can use if you wish to have more fine-grained control Export validators The default command for exporting your slashing protection history is:
Preventing Eth2 Validator Failure - HackMD Preventing Eth2 Validator Failure Modes of Failure Preventing Failure Proposals for SSV protocols Type 1 Type 2 Random thoughts Modes of Failure Beacon Node: Liveness: Suggest attestation block proposal on non-canonical chain Go offline Validator Client: Safety: Key Safety: Validator key compromise Slashing Safety: Producing slashable attestations blocks Liveness: Go offline Preventing Failure
How To Set Up ETH Validator, Prevent Slashing Enabling MEV Boost For . . . To cut is short - Always remember if you are migrating from hardware to another, even with slash protection data file, PLEASE wait for at least 5 Epoch MISSES on your validator before importing your keystore and protection file towards the device you wish to migrate to, ONLY 1 device should be running the keystore
SafeStake - ParaState Rust is king in preventing memory-related bugs and vulnerabilities, always beats Go in runtime benchmarks Superior Slashing Protection HotStuff, the first partially-synchronous BFT replication protocol, is more robust than iBFT or qBFT It helps ensure consensus is reached and minimizes the chances of slashing for validators on the SafeStake